Freedom of Navigation in the Indo-Pacific Region by Kaye, Stuart
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - 
Papers Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities 
1-1-2008 
Freedom of Navigation in the Indo-Pacific Region 
Stuart Kaye 
University of Western Australia, skaye@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kaye, Stuart, "Freedom of Navigation in the Indo-Pacific Region" (2008). Faculty of Law, Humanities and 
the Arts - Papers. 1426. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1426 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Freedom of Navigation in the Indo-Pacific Region 
Abstract 
International law generally, and the law of the sea in particular, exert a tremendous influence on Australian 
interests, not merely in the oceans around the continent, but within the Australian economy generally. 
Australia asserts its jurisdiction over the largest maritime area in the world, with an exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) and continental shelf over 1.5 times the size of mainland Australia, and a search and rescue 
responsibility covering 10 per cent of the globe. Over 95 per cent by volume of Australian international 
trade reaches Australia by sea. Over 99 per cent of the data traffic passing along communications links 
reaches Australia through fibre optic submarine cables. The Australian fishing industry, although small by 
world standards, generates over $50 billion per annum into the national economy. More fundamentally, 
over 85 per cent of the Australian population lives within an hour of the coastline, all of which provides a 
strong domestic security imperative for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and other Government 
agencies to keep Australia’s maritime areas adequately under surveillance and protected. The law of the 
sea has a direct impact on ensuring these interests can be protected and the means and mechanisms 
available to Australia to do so. This paper examines relevant trends in the law of the sea that impact upon 
Australian interests, and assesses regional law of the sea practice. 
Keywords 
indo, navigation, freedom, region, pacific 
Disciplines 
Arts and Humanities | Law 
Publication Details 
Kaye, S. (2008). Freedom of Navigation in the Indo-Pacific Region. Australia: Sea Power Centre. 
This book is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1426 
Freedom of  
Navigation in the 
Indo-Pacific Region
No. 22
Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs 
Stuart Kaye
SEA POWER CENTRE - AUSTRALIA

© Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 2008
This work is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of study, research, 
criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, and with standard source 
credit included, no part may be reproduced without written permission. Inquiries should 
be addressed to the Director, Sea Power Centre – Australia, Department of Defence, 
CANBERRA ACT 2600.
Kaye, Stuart 1967 —




The views expressed is that of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official 
policy or position of the Government of Australia, the Department of Defence or the 
Royal Australian Navy. The Commonwealth of Australia will not be legally responsible 
in contract, tort or otherwise for any statement made in this publication.
The Sea Power Centre – Australia (SPC-A), was established to undertake activities 
to promote the study, discussion and awareness of maritime issues and strategy 




strategic concepts and strategic and operational level doctrine, and facilitate 
informed force structure decisions
Comment on this Paper or any inquiry related to the activities of the Sea Power 
Centre – Australia should be directed to:
Department of Defence Telephone: +61 2 6127 6512 
Canberra  ACT  2600 Facsimile: +61 2 6127 6519 
Australia Email: seapower.centre@defence.gov.au 
 Internet: www.navy.gov.au/spc
The Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs series is a vehicle for the distribution of 
substantial work by members of the Royal Australian Navy as well as members of the 
Australian and international community undertaking original research into regional 
maritime issues. The series is designed to foster debate and discussion on maritime 
issues of relevance to the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Defence Force, Australia 
and the region more generally.
Other volumes in the series are:
No. 1  From Empire Defence to the Long Haul: Post-war Defence Policy and 
its Impact on Naval Force Structure Planning 1945–1955 by Hector 
Donohue
No. 2 No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945–1996 by James Goldrick
No. 3 Coastal Shipping: The Vital Link by Mary Ganter
No. 4 Australian Carrier Decisions: The Decisions to Procure HMA Ships 
Albatross, Sydney and Melbourne by Anthony Wright
No. 5 Issues in Regional Maritime Strategy: Papers by Foreign Visiting Military 
Fellows with the Royal Australian Navy Maritime Studies Program — 1998 
edited by David Wilson 
No. 6 Australia’s Naval Inheritance: Imperial Maritime Strategy and the 
Australia Station 1880–1909 by Nicholas A. Lambert 
No. 7 Maritime Aviation: Prospects for the 21st Century edited by David Stevens
No. 8 Maritime War in the 21st Century: The Medium and Small Navy Perspective 
edited by David Wilson
No. 9 HMAS Sydney II: The Cruiser and the Controversy in the Archives of the 
United Kingdom edited by Captain Peter Hore, RN
No. 10 The Strategic Importance of Seaborne Trade and Shipping: A Common 
Interest of Asia Pacific edited by Andrew Forbes
No. 11 Protecting Maritime Resources: Boundary Delimitation, Resource Conflicts 
and Constabulary Responsibilities edited by Barry Snushall and Rachael 
Heath
No. 12 Australian Maritime Issues 2004: SPC-A Annual edited by Glenn Kerr
No. 13 Future Environmental Policy Trends to 2020 edited by Glenn Kerr and Barry 
Snushall
No. 14 Peter Mitchell Essays 2003 edited by Glenn Kerr
No. 15 A Critical Vulnerability: The Impact of the Submarine Threat on Australia’s 
Maritime Defence 1915–1954 by David Stevens
No. 16 Australian Maritime Issues: SPC-A Annual 2005 edited by Gregory P. Gilbert 
and Robert J. Davitt
No. 17 Australian Naval Personalities edited by Gregory P. Gilbert
No. 18 ADF Training in Australia’s Maritime Environment edited by Chris Rahman 
and Robert J. Davitt
No. 19 Australian Maritime Issues 2006: SPC-A Annual edited by Andrew Forbes 
and Michelle Lovi
No. 20 The Russian Pacific Fleet: From the Crimean War to Perestroika by Alexey 
D. Muraviev
No. 21 Australian Maritime Issues 2007: SPC-A Annual edited by Andrew Forbes
No. 22 Freedom of Navigation in the Indo-Pacific Region by Stuart Kaye
About the Author ix
Abbreviations  xi
Emerging Issues in the Law of the Sea to 2020 and their  
Impacts for Australia and the Indo-Pacific Region 1
Freedom of Navigation 2
Freedom of Navigation in Archipelagos 15
Military Operations in the Exclusive Economic Zone 17
Maritime Security 21
Regional Practice in the Law of the Sea 31
Regional Attitudes to Security Jurisdiction 31
Impact of the Law of the Sea on Australian National Interests 37




1. State practice – width of the territorial sea 3
2. State practice – width of the territorial sea (Asian and Pacific States) 4
3. State practice – freedom of navigation and security 12
4. States that have objected to nuclear ships passing through  
their territorial seas or exclusive economic zones 14
5. Freedom of navigation – position on restrictions by coastal States 15
6. Regional archipelagic State practice 16
7. Regional environmental and fisheries treaties 28

Stuart Kaye was appointed to a Chair in Law at the University of Melbourne in 2006. 
Prior to that, he was the Dean of Law at the University of Wollongong from 2002-06, 
and Head of School at James Cook University Law School from 2001-02. He holds 
degrees in arts and law from the University of Sydney, winning the Law Graduates’ 
Association Medal, and a doctorate in law from Dalhousie University. He is admitted 
as a barrister of the Supreme Courts of New South Wales, Tasmania and Queensland, 
and of the High Court of Australia.
Professor Kaye has a research interest in the law of the sea and international law 
generally, and has published extensively in these areas. He has written a number 
of books including Australia’s Maritime Boundaries (2nd edn, 2001), The Torres Strait 
(1997), Human Rights in International and Australian Law (with R. Piotrowicz)(2001), 
and International Fisheries Management (2001). He was appointed by Australia to the 
International Hydrographic Organization’s Panel of Experts on Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation in 1995 and in 2000 was appointed by Australia to the List of Arbitrators 
under the 1991 Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty. He was made a Fellow of the 
Royal Geographical Society in 2007.
Professor Kaye is the current Chair of the Australian International Humanitarian Law 
Dissemination Committee.  He has undertaken consulting work for government and 
industry, including the Australian Departments of Defence; Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries; Finance; Environment and Heritage and Geoscience Australia, AusAid, the 
Canadian International Development Agency, the Canadian Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans, the US Navy and the Commonwealth Secretariat.  He has presented papers 
in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, the European Union, southern 
Africa, the South Pacific and South East Asia.  He appeared for the Government of 
Tasmania in constitutional litigation in the High Court of Australia in Grain Poll of 
Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479.
Professor Kaye is also a legal officer in the Royal Australian Navy Reserve, principally 
providing advice on operations and international law.

ADF Australian Defence Force
ASL Archipelagic Sea Lanes
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
IMO International Maritime Organization
ISPS International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
LOSC United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
MV Merchant Vessel
nm nautical mile
NWC (United States) Naval War College
RAN Royal Australian Navy
USN United States Navy

International law generally, and the law of the sea in particular, exert a tremendous 
influence on Australian interests, not merely in the oceans around the continent, 
but within the Australian economy generally. Australia asserts its jurisdiction over 
the largest maritime area in the world, with an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 
continental shelf over 1.5 times the size of mainland Australia,1 and a search and 
rescue responsibility covering 10 per cent of the globe.2 Over 95 per cent by volume 
of Australian international trade reaches Australia by sea.3 Over 99 per cent of the 
data traffic passing along communications links reaches Australia through fibre optic 
submarine cables.4 The Australian fishing industry, although small by world standards, 
generates over $50 billion per annum into the national economy.5 More fundamentally, 
over 85 per cent of the Australian population lives within an hour of the coastline, all of 
which provides a strong domestic security imperative for the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF) and other Government agencies to keep Australia’s maritime areas adequately 
under surveillance and protected. The law of the sea has a direct impact on ensuring 
these interests can be protected and the means and mechanisms available to Australia 
to do so. This paper examines relevant trends in the law of the sea that impact upon 
Australian interests, and assesses regional law of the sea practice.
In part, this paper has been prepared as an analysis of, and response to, the paper 
entitled A Stronger and More Prosperous World through Secure and Accessible Seas 
prepared at the United States Naval War College (NWC) under the direction of the 
then Stockton Professor of International Law, Craig Allen. That paper was the result 
of a workshop on the future legal global order and was attended by 42 legal experts, 
from the United States and 10 other States working in government and academia, in 
November 2006. The workshop participants, on a non-attributable basis, attempted 
to predict the shape and content of international law as it would affect global legal 
order between 2006 and 2020. This paper will examine the conclusions reached by 
the experts in the NWC paper and comment on their conclusions. As an effort at 
prognostication, it is impossible to evaluate the validity of the conclusions reached, 
as it relates to events that have yet to occur, and may not occur for over a decade into 
the future. It will however, attempt to test the probability of the experts’ predictions, 
in the light of current developments and past State practice.
Given Australia’s strong reliance on its seaborne trade, the ability of vessels to navigate 
without substantial restriction around the world is a critical issue. Even though the 
bulk of this trade is carried in vessels registered in other States, it is vital to Australian 
interests that the guarantees in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
(LOSC) providing for freedom of navigation are retained, upheld and respected by all 
States.6 The unlawful restriction of the sea lines of communication between Australia 
and the rest of the world could devastate the Australian national economy, and it is 
in Australia’s interest to support the existing international legal regime, which has 
proven so effective in keeping international sea lanes open and flowing.
The key feature of the NWC paper is the survey of experts with respect to the likelihood 
of change to the regime for freedom of navigation in the LOSC in the foreseeable future. 
The experts indicated, in varying percentages, their thoughts on whether provisions 
in respect of maritime claims and freedom of navigation were being undermined. 
While one response to these suggestions would be the author’s own predictions, one 
more certain response is to analyse State behaviour in the past 25 years to determine 
whether erosion of the LOSC is actually taking place, and in what areas that erosion 
is most pronounced. In this way, objective State behaviour can be compared with the 
predictions to test their validity, as it is unlikely that the rejection of the LOSC by a large 
number of States would happen instantaneously or spontaneously. Rather it would be 
marked by a gradual build-up of contrary practice that can be charted and analysed. 
The NWC paper noted that there was a substantial likelihood of instability in the 
regimes for innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes (ASL) 
passage. They stated:
Navigation freedoms cannot be taken for granted in the coming years. 
The experts were asked if they believed the following navigation regimes 
would remain stable between now and 2020:
38% believed that the innocent passage regime would not remain 
stable;
41% said the same thing about transit passage through international 
straits; and
51% did not believe archipelagic sea lanes passage would remain 
stable.
95% of the experts believed that more States will claim the right to 
exercise jurisdiction and control over military activities in their EEZ 
by 2020.7
It is submitted that instability and failure of LOSC regimes for freedom of navigation 
would not occur instantaneously, but rather would emerge over time through contrary 
State practice. In order to test the likelihood of failure, State practice with respect to 
maritime zones and freedom of navigation will be examined statistically, to determine 
whether such contrary behaviour, as might be expected prior to regime failure is 
evident.
The first relevant example of State practice for freedom of navigation is in respect of 
the territorial sea. Prior to the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III) conducted over the period 1973-82, the width of the territorial sea was 
an issue of great contention. Disagreement over the issue of the width of the territorial 
sea was principally responsible for the failure of the League of Nations Conference for 
the Codification of International Law 19308 and of UNCLOS II (1960),9 where it was the 
principal issue for the Conference to resolve. By UNCLOS III, the width of the territorial 
sea was less of an issue, with the emergence of the EEZ as an accepted concept, and 
consequently there was little contention in the adoption of 12 nautical miles as the 
maximum breadth of the territorial sea in article 3 of the LOSC.10
It is apparent from the selection of State practice that the LOSC reflects a consensus 
on the distance of 12 nautical miles, as shown in Table 1.






Table 1: State practice – width of the territorial sea11
Table 1 shows that 12 nautical miles was the favoured distance for the width of the 
territorial sea by 1982, with 68 per cent of States using that distance, and a further 
14 per cent using distances of less than 12 nautical miles, which is consistent with 
article 3. This means that only 18 per cent of littoral States were using distances for 
their territorial sea that were inconsistent with the LOSC. By 2007, 89 per cent of 
littoral States were using 12 nautical miles, and a further four per cent using lesser 
distances. This is a significant improvement and demonstrates some normative effect 
around article 3.
This conclusion is also supported by the practice of some of those States whose 
territorial sea claims are inconsistent with the LOSC. For example, Benin, Congo, 
Somalia, Liberia, and Togo assert a territorial sea of 200 nautical miles, but do so 
from legislation that predates the LOSC.12 This suggests these States have been lax in 
updating their legislative regimes rather than deliberately flouting the LOSC. 
Similar results can be seen in a selection of Asia-Pacific States using the same criteria, 
as shown in Table 2.





Table 2: State practice – width of the territorial sea (Asian and Pacific States)
If anything, the dominance of 12 nautical miles in a contemporary context is more 
pronounced in the Asia-Pacific region. Ninety-four per cent of regional States were in 
compliance with the LOSC in 2007, up from 88 per cent in 1982.
While the width of the territorial sea achieving a strong consensus mitigates against the 
fracturing of the navigational regimes referred to in the NWC paper, it is by no means 
the only relevant factor. State practice in relation to restrictions upon navigation also 
needs to be considered. Freedom of navigation has its origins in Hugo Grotius’ response 
to the Spanish and Portuguese claims of control over the oceans and territories outside 
of Europe by virtue of the Papal Bull and Treaty of Tordesillas.13 These documents 
purported not only to give control over territory outside of Europe, but also provided 
for exclusive seaborne trading rights in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.14 In 
reaction to this assertion, Grotius produced his seminal work, Mare Liberum, asserting 
that the oceans were incapable of appropriation by States, and that the ships of any 
State could journey anywhere on the world’s oceans.15
In the modern law of the sea, freedom of navigation was perceived as equally important, 
and this status was reflected in the now superseded Geneva Conventions on the Law 
of the Sea. Article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1958 
guaranteed a right of innocent passage to vessels, non-suspendable for waters in 
international straits, and article 23 indicated explicitly that such rights were available 
to warships.16 Freedom of navigation on the high seas was guaranteed in article 2 of the 
Convention on the High Seas 1958,17 with article 3 of the Convention of the Continental 
Shelf Convention 1958 ensuring that the status of waters above a State’s continental 
shelf remained as high seas, and therefore enjoying freedom of navigation.18 These 
efforts had been prefaced by the International Court of Justice in 1949, in the Corfu 
Channel Case, which confirmed the right of innocent passage, available even to 
warships, passing through ‘straits used for international navigation’.19 The Court was 
also prepared to state that foreign vessels, including warships, during peacetime had 
a right of innocent passage through all international straits.
The current LOSC maintains the approaches found in the Corfu Channel Case and 
the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. It deals with navigation in two 
distinct contexts. Firstly, it examines freedom of navigation in the territorial sea and 
archipelagic waters. Three passage regimes are established in these waters: innocent 
passage, transit passage and ASL passage. It then considers freedom of navigation in 
areas beyond national sovereignty in article 87.
The regime of innocent passage deals with navigation by ships only in the territorial sea 
of a coastal State, and as noted above, it retains the same approach as that used in the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1958 and the Corfu Channel Case. 
LOSC article 17 grants ships the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, 
while the remaining articles in section 3(A) indicate how that right is circumscribed. 
Essentially vessels are required to transit in a continuous and expeditious fashion, 
on the surface of the ocean. Such passage cannot be impeded, except on a non-
discriminatory and temporary basis for essential security purposes.20
LOSC article 19 indicates the activities of a vessel that are considered inconsistent 
with a right of innocent passage:
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good 
order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in 
conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international 
law.
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea 
it engages in any of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any 
other manner in violation of the principles of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the 
defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or 
security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military 
device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person 
contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and 
regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this 
Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication 
or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
This list does not render passage undertaken by warships, or even squadrons of 
warships, contrary to innocent passage, nor does it permit a coastal State from excluding 
warships from its waters for failure to notify the coastal State or seek its authorisation. 
This is supported by the view taken by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu 
Channel Case of the passage of the four British warships along the Channel that led to 
the damage to HM Ships Saumarez and Volage.21  
The coastal State has the ability to regulate certain matters with respect to a vessel 
exercising a right of innocent passage, as listed in LOSC article 21(1):
The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with 
the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, 
relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of 
all or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime 
traffic;
(b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other 
facilities or installations;
(c) the protection of cables and pipelines;
(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea;
(e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and 
regulations of the coastal State;
(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and 
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof;
(g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys;
(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal 
State.
Laws on these subjects cannot be applied to a foreign warship or other sovereign 
immune vessel, but can provide a basis for a claim by the coastal State against the flag 
State of the offending warship. A warship or other vessel can only be ordered to depart 
the territorial sea in the event that it breaches the laws of the coastal State.22  
For transit passage through international straits, and ASL passage through archipelagic 
waters, the regime is even more generous to transiting vessels. There can be no 
suspension of transit or ASL passage in any circumstances, and the range of laws 
available to a coastal State applicable to such vessels is also reduced as is evident in 
LOSC article 42 and by extension through article 54 to ASL passage:
1. Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits may 
adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage through straits, 
in respect of all or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic, 
as provided in article 41;
(b) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution, by giving 
effect to applicable international regulations regarding the 
discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the 
strait;
(c) with respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of fishing, 
including the stowage of fishing gear;
(d) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person 
in contravention of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary 
laws and regulations of States bordering straits.
2. Such laws and regulations shall not discriminate in form or in fact 
among foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect of 
denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit passage as defined 
in this section.
3. States bordering straits shall give due publicity to all such laws and 
regulations.
4. Foreign ships exercising the right of transit passage shall comply 
with such laws and regulations.
5. The flag State of a ship or the State of registry of an aircraft entitled 
to sovereign immunity which acts in a manner contrary to such laws 
and regulations or other provisions of this Part shall bear international 
responsibility for any loss or damage which results to States bordering 
straits.23
While the LOSC makes it clear there is freedom of navigation on the high seas, the 
same freedom is extended to the EEZ by article 58(1).24 
The right of freedom of navigation on the high seas and the EEZ is limited so a vessel 
must have ‘due regard’ for the rights of others.25 As such, there is no explicit limitation 
based upon security to the benefit of the coastal State beyond that associated with the 
rights of others. So for example, the only restriction on the undertaking of military 
exercises on the high seas and EEZ of another State would be subject to the non-
interference with the rights of other users.26 The issue of military activities in the EEZ 
will be explored below.
Within the territorial sea, and in some circumstances beyond it, a number of States 
assert what may best be described as a ‘security jurisdiction’. That is to say, they 
purport to regulate, restrict or exclude third State vessels from their adjacent waters, 
even though the only support for such a jurisdiction in the LOSC is implicit and derives 
from the Convention’s definition of innocent passage not being prejudicial to the peace 
and security of the coastal State.
A coastal State has a right to regulate certain matters with respect to a vessel exercising 
a right of innocent passage, although these do not refer to security interests.27 The 
rights of the coastal State are essentially directed at ensuring the territorial sea has 
safe navigation, criminal activity affecting the coastal State, including immigration and 
customs, is prohibited, and unauthorised fishing and pollution do not occur.
Nor does the regime of the contiguous zone give rise to a right to restrict or regulate 
passage. There is no justification within the text of the LOSC that permits a jurisdiction 
based around security concerns to be included within the regime of the contiguous 
zone, especially as it is part of the EEZ which explicitly has guarantees of freedom of 
navigation. The contiguous zone is dealt with in a single article, and does not refer to 
security directly, or even by implication.28
A large number of coastal States assert security zones in their territorial sea and 
beyond, into the EEZ. The range of measures varies considerably, and does not easily 
lend itself to the type of statistical representation undertaken above. Overall, in 
excess of 60 coastal States have asserted some form of restriction or notification. It 
is therefore necessary to summarise the nature of various coastal State measures in 
tabular form in Table 3.
State Type of Rights Asserted
Albania Warships require prior special authorisation
Algeria Authorisation must be obtained for warships 15 days prior to their 
passage; exception: force majeure
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Warships require prior authorisation
Bangladesh Warships require prior authorisation; contiguous zone of 18nm 
with security interests
State Type of Rights Asserted
Barbados Warships require prior authorisation
Brazil Prohibition of the boarding, searching and capturing of vessels in 
the EEZ; military exercises and manoeuvres may be conducted 
in the EEZ only with the consent of Brazil
Bulgaria 24nm (‘control rights’)
Cambodia Control of all foreign activities on the continental shelf, 
irrespective of their purpose; contiguous zone of 24nm with 
security interests
Cape Verde Warships require prior authorisation; prohibition of ‘non-
innocent use’ of the exclusive economic zone, including weapons 
exercises
China Requires prior notice for transports of waste in territorial sea 
and EEZ; warships require prior authorisation; contiguous zone 
of 24nm with security interests
Congo All ships require prior authorisation
Costa Rica Fishing vessels must announce their passage through the EEZ 
beforehand
Croatia Warships must announce their passage; the number of warships 
is limited
Denmark Warships and governmental ships are required to notify the 
Danish authorities prior to their passage through territorial waters 
if that involves passage through the Great Belt, the Samsø Belt 
or the Øre Sound; prior authorisation is required for more than 
three warships passing through at the same time
Djibouti Prior notice required of any passage of nuclear-powered ships and 
ships carrying nuclear or other radioactive material
Ecuador ‘Special area to be avoided’
Egypt Warships have to announce their passage in advance; ships 
carrying nuclear material or other hazardous substances require 
prior authorisation; contiguous zone of 24nm with security 
interests
El Salvador Expressed concern at UNCLOS III in respect of military activities 
in the EEZ
Estonia Warships and research vessels must announce their passage 
48 hours in advance; authorisation must be applied for nuclear-
powered ships 30 days; prior to their passage
State Type of Rights Asserted
Finland Warships and governmental ships have to announce their passage 
in advance
Gambia Asserts the right to prohibit navigation in certain areas of its 
continental shelf
Greece Claims only a 6nm territorial sea but 10nm of airspace for air 
traffic control purposes
Grenada Warships require prior authorisation
Guinea Taking photographs and transporting toxic or hazardous material 
are considered a criminal offence
Guyana Warships have to announce their passage in advance
Haiti Passage prohibited to ships carrying waste or materials with 
an inherent health or environmental hazard; prohibition of 
the passage of all vessels carrying waste or materials that are 
environmentally harmful or detrimental to health; furthermore 
claims the right to exercise the control required in the EEZ in order 
to ensure navigational safety and prevent violations of financial, 
customs, health and environmental protection regulations; 
contiguous zone of 24nm with security interests
India Warships have to announce their passage in advance; prior 
consent to military exercises and manoeuvres in the EEZ and 
on the continental shelf; contiguous zone of 24nm with security 
interests
Indonesia Warships and all vessels other than merchant ships must 
announce their passage in advance; within 100nm ships are not 
allowed to stop, anchor or cruise ‘without legitimate cause’
Iran Warships, submarines, nuclear-powered ships as well as 
ships carrying nuclear or other hazardous materials require 
authorisation; prohibition of ‘military activities and practices’ in 
the EEZ and on the continental shelf; contiguous zone of 24nm 
with security interests
Latvia Reserves the right to regulate the passage of warships
Libya Innocent passage to be announced in advance and allowed during 
daylight hours only; four exclusion zones
Lithuania Warships require prior authorisation if this is required by the 
flag state
Malaysia Prior consent to military exercises and manoeuvres in the EEZ 
and on the continental shelf
State Type of Rights Asserted
Maldives Warships require prior authorisation; with regard to the EEZ, 
acknowledge only the right of innocent passage; make entry of 
fishing and research vessels into the EEZ conditional upon prior 
consent
Malta Asserts the claim for warships to obtain prior authorisation
Mauritania Reserves the right to restrict navigation and aviation in or above 
the EEZ if this is necessary for reasons of national security
Mauritius Warships must announce their passage; apparently makes the 
passage of warships and submarines through the EEZ conditional 
upon prior approval
Myanmar Warships require prior authorisation; claims the right to restrict 
the freedom of navigation and overflight in its exclusive EEZ zone 
of 24nm with security interests
Namibia Claims sovereign rights with regard to financial, customs, 
immigration and health regulations in the EEZ as well
Nicaragua 25nm security interests, 15 days advance notification for warships 
and military aircraft, seven days for civilian traffic
North Korea 62nm military zone 50nm seaward of the territorial sea; all ships 
and aircraft require prior approval
Oman Warships, nuclear-powered ships, submarines and ships carrying 
hazardous loads require prior authorisation
Pakistan Warships require prior authorisation; supertankers, nuclear-
powered ships and ships carrying nuclear materials are required 
to announce their passage in advance; claims authority to 
regulate transit through parts of the EEZ and enact and enforce 
all regulations required for controlling activities in the EEZ; 
contiguous zone of 24nm with security interests
Peru Prior consent to military exercises and manoeuvres in the EEZ 
and on the continental shelf
Philippines Expressed concern at UNCLOS III in respect of military activities 
in the EEZ
Poland Reserves the right to regulate the passage of warships
Portugal With regard to the EEZ, acknowledges only the right of innocent 
passage
Romania Reserves the right to regulate the passage of warships
São Tomé and 
Príncipe
Reserves the right to regulate the passage of warships
State Type of Rights Asserted
Saudi Arabia Reserves the right to regulate the passage of nuclear-powered 
ships; contiguous zone of 18nm with security interests and 
navigation
Senegal Expressed concern at UNCLOS III in respect of military activities 
in the EEZ
Seychelles Warships are required to announce their passage in advance
Slovenia Reserves the right to regulate the passage of warships
Somalia Warships require prior authorisation
South Korea Warships and government ships have to announce their passage 
three days in advance
Sri Lanka Warships require prior authorisation; contiguous zone of 24nm 
with security interests
St. Vincent and 
Grenadines
Warships require prior authorisation
Sudan Warships require prior authorisation; the right of innocent passage 
may be suspended for security reasons; contiguous zone of 18nm 
with security interests
Syria Warships require prior authorisation; 41nm security interests
United Arab 
Emirates 
Warships require prior authorisation; nuclear-powered ships 
and ships with nuclear or hazardous loads must announce their 
passage in advance; contiguous zone of 24nm with security 
interests
Uruguay Asserts the right to prohibit military exercises in the EEZ
Venezuela 15nm national and security interests
Vietnam Warships require authorisation to be applied for at least 30 days 
prior to passage; passage restricted to three warships at a time; 
contiguous zone of 24nm with security interests, submarines are 
required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag; aircraft 
are not allowed to land on board ships or be launched from them; 
on-board weapons have to be set in ‘non-operational’ mode prior 
to entry into the zone
Yemen Warships require prior authorisation; nuclear-powered ships or 
ships carrying nuclear materials must announce their passage in 
advance; contiguous zone of 24nm with security interests
Yugoslavia Warships must announce their passage 24 hours in advance
Table 3: State practice – freedom of navigation and security29
The number and scope of these restrictions raise the possibility that some aspects of 
freedom of navigation under the LOSC are under pressure from States asserting some 
form of ‘security jurisdiction’. The measures summarised in Table 3 clearly amount 
to restrictions upon the freedom of navigation in terms of access and notification that 
are inconsistent with the LOSC. The question to ask is whether these restrictions are 
undermining the LOSC protections on freedom of navigation in the manner indicated 
in the NWC paper.
It is submitted that while this level of activity contrary to the LOSC is a matter for 
concern, it does not amount to a new and evolving threat to the regimes of innocent, 
transit and ASL passage. Most of these security restrictions are many years old, and in 
any case, are not enforced by their coastal States. Certainly the United States maintains 
an active Freedom of Navigation program that provides for operational challenges to 
perceived unlawful restrictions.30 With some high profile exceptions, most notably 
the attitude of China in respect of innocent passage through its territorial sea and the 
Taiwan Straits, there does not seem to be a groundswell of challenge to the existing 
order beyond what has subsisted for many years. It is submitted that there is no greater 
likelihood of the failure of the navigation regime in the LOSC than at any time in the 
past two decades.
A number of States have also sought to assert the right to deny vessels carrying 
ultra-hazardous cargoes, most notably nuclear materials for reprocessing or disposal, 
passage through not only their territorial sea, but even their EEZ. These States have 
often been motivated by particular incidents, where vessels have been likely to pass 
through their waters on planned voyages between other States. Such voyages between 
Europe and Japan have elicited responses from States in Africa, South America and 
the South Pacific.
The LOSC provides little direct assistance for States who wish to assert the right to 
deny passage to vessels carrying ultra-hazardous cargoes. There is no indication in 
the LOSC of any restriction that can be placed on navigation in the EEZ based on the 
nature of the cargo. Indeed, the LOSC appears to indicate the reverse situation is the 
case; that is, that ships carrying hazardous cargoes can navigate freely. This can be 
seen in respect of the exercise of innocent passage for ships carrying nuclear or other 
hazardous materials in article 23:
Foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other 
inherently dangerous or noxious substances shall, when exercising the 
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, carry documents 
and observe special precautionary measures established for such ships 
by international agreements.
Rather than indicate duties owed to the coastal State, and the option of that State to deny 
passage, article 23 indicates that special precautionary measures drawn from other 
instruments ought to be complied with. No similar provision exists for the EEZ.
The rationalisation for States seeking to exclude shipping is based upon their 
jurisdiction in the EEZ over environmental matters. It is argued by these States that the 
ultra-hazardous nature of the cargo poses such a threat to the environment that they 
have a right to prevent the possibility of irreparable harm occurring. At the very least, 
they have a right to be notified of a voyage carrying such cargo, if only to be prepared 
to respond appropriately to an accident or other disaster, should one occur.
Examples of State practice from States that take the view that freedom of navigation 
can be circumscribed because of a ship’s cargo cover a range of situations. As a result 
of the break up of the oil tanker Prestige in November 2002, Spain and France asserted 
that they would undertake inspections of singlehulled oil tankers in excess of 15 years 
old passing through their EEZs, and if the vessels were found to be unseaworthy, they 
would not be permitted to remain in the EEZ.31
Further examples can be drawn from international reactions to shipments of radioactive 
materials around the world, particularly since the 1990s. The voyages of the Pacific 
Pintail, Pacific Teal and Pacific Swan and the Atatsuki Maru carrying highly radioactive 
material attracted protests from a significant number of States, and led States such as 
Argentina, Chile, Antigua and Barbuda, Colombia, Dominican Republic, New Zealand, 
South Africa and Mauritius to all purport to exclude vessels carrying radioactive 
ultrahazardous cargo from their EEZs. Voyages were also condemned by Caricom, 
representing the Caribbean States, and the South Pacific States.32 States who have 
asserted that they do not permit nuclear cargo vessels in their territorial sea or EEZ 
are noted in Table 4.













Table 4: States that have objected to nuclear ships passing  
through their territorial seas or exclusive economic zones
From this data, the LOSC does not appear to have exerted a similar normative impact 
in the context of freedom of navigation.  A large number of States purport to restrict 
or regulate navigation in their territorial seas or beyond without reference to the 
LOSC, and in apparent contravention of it. Much of this activity is concentrated in 
the area of security, but there are significant numbers of States also purporting to 
limit or regulate the navigation rights of vessels carrying ultra-hazardous cargos, as 
shown in Table 5.
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Table 5: Freedom of navigation – position on restrictions by coastal States
Surprisingly, when considered in the context of coastal States only, those States seeking 
restriction or regulation make up 52 per cent of the international community. This raises 
the question as to whether the LOSC in the context of freedom of navigation represents 
customary international law, and whether such behaviour might serve in the long term 
to undermine the efficacy of the LOSC in this or other areas. It would certainly be a 
matter of concern that so large a proportion of the international community have taken 
the view that restriction of innocent passage in certain circumstances is permissible, 
although it is debatable that this is sufficient to foresee the destruction of the freedom 
of navigation regimes within the LOSC.
Freedom of navigation is particularly significant to Australia, as many of the world’s 
archipelagic States are in the Asia-Pacific region. To Australia’s north, Indonesia, Papua 
New Guinea, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and further afield the Philippines and 
Kiribati, all claim archipelagic status. Archipelagic States can claim that the waters 
between their islands are part of their sovereignty, limiting passage rights to innocent 
passage except along ASL. Such ASL are designated by the archipelagic States, in 
consultation with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), or failing a formal 
declaration, are routes normally used for international navigation.
In the context of ASL passage, State practice is so limited it is not possible to undertake 
the type of analysis engaged in above. Although many States in Australia’s region 
are archipelagos, and have proclaimed archipelagic baselines, only Indonesia has 
proclaimed any ASL at all. This is evident from a limited survey of archipelagic State 
practice in our region.
Archipelagic Baselines LOSC Compliant ASL
Fiji Yes Yes No
Indonesia Yes Yes Partial
Kiribati No Unlikely No
Papua New Guinea Yes Yes No
Philippines Unofficial No No
Solomon Islands Yes Yes No
Vanuatu Yes Yes No
Table 6: Regional archipelagic State practice
A number of points can be made in relation to Table 6. First, with the exception of the 
Philippines, whose practice doesn’t comply with international law, and has no support 
from any other States, all the archipelagic States have baselines which comply closely 
with the LOSC, if they have baselines at all. This is not suggestive of a failure of the 
LOSC, but rather it is exerting a normative impact upon international practice.
Second, international practice concerning ASL passage is at a relative basic stage, even 
though the LOSC has been in force for over a decade. This also does not suggest that 
there is a likelihood the LOSC is under threat, as the interim position of using routes 
normally used by international navigation pending the proclamation of ASL, has not 
proven unacceptable to most archipelagic States in the past 13 years, and it is also 
the most advantageous position for maritime States wanting freedom of navigation. 
For the LOSC to be under threat of destabilisation, it would be logical to expect some 
countervailing State practice.
The exception in all of this is Indonesia, which is the only archipelagic State that has 
any ASL in place at all. Indonesia is committed to the concept of the archipelagic 
State to a greater extent than any other State, and much of the text of the LOSC was 
drafted to reflect Indonesian practice. However, in spite of this compliant practice, it is 
significant to note that some Indonesian perceptions of the application of international 
law are often significantly at variance with the LOSC. In the context of ASL, Indonesia 
proposed in 1996 only three north-south lanes. The absence of over 10 other routes 
used by international navigation led to significant international protest from maritime 
States, including Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan. In this 
environment, Indonesia commenced negotiations with the IMO, with Australia and the 
United States participating. In 1998, Indonesia formally adopted three lanes, but these 
were explicitly stated to be a ‘partial designation’, leaving the way open for maritime 
States to regard any route used by international navigation as an ASL.
Statements by Indonesia since the partial designation make it clear that it has a different 
view. Senior Indonesian officials have avoided all reference to the ASL designation as 
partial and indicated that ASL passage is only possible in the lanes and not on routes 
used by international navigation. Indonesia has passed legislation dealing explicitly 
with ASL passage. Act No. 6 of 8 August 1996 provides for ‘peaceful crossing rights’ 
and ‘archipelagic sea channel crossing rights’. The former appears to equate to the 
regime of innocent passage under the LOSC and Indonesia reserves the right to 
‘temporarily postpone peaceful crossing’ of its territorial sea and archipelagic waters 
for ‘the protection of its security, including the purpose of arms/weapons training’. For 
ASL passage this is inconsistent with LOSC article 54 which applies article 44 of the 
transit passage regime prohibiting suspension of passage. The Indonesian legislation 
also provides that submarines and other submerged vessel are required to navigate on 
the surface and show their flag in this mode of passage, which is also not consistent 
with ‘normal mode’ in the ASL passage regime.
Rights of ASL passage are preserved in the legislation but only in ‘specially stipulated 
sea channels’. This is contrary to the negotiation of the partial designation of ASL, 
which was intended to allow other lanes normally used for international navigation 
to be available for ASL passage, consistent with the LOSC. If Indonesian practice in 
this regard remains unique, then the threat to ASL passage as a viable legal regime is 
certainly containable. If Australia and other maritime States continue to assert their 
rights of ASL passage through the archipelago’s principal sea routes, and not merely 
along the three designated routes, then these protests will effectively quarantine 
Indonesia’s behaviour.
Military activities and operations in the EEZ of third States was also considered in the 
NWC paper. Beyond the territorial sea, the LOSC confirms there is freedom of navigation 
for all vessels, as well as a number of other freedoms. Article 87 provides:
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. 
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down 
by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, 
inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to 
Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations 
permitted under international law, subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in 
section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for 
the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high 
seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with 
respect to activities in the Area.
The impact of this provision finds its way into the regime of the EEZ by virtue 
of article 58, which expressly incorporates rights of freedom of navigation and 
overflight.
The issue of military activities, including surveillance, in the EEZ of another State is 
one not directly dealt with in the LOSC.33 While the LOSC makes it plain that military 
exercises and weaponry testing in the territorial sea of a coastal State would be contrary 
to the regime of innocent passage, there is no equivalent restriction articulated with 
respect to other maritime zones. However, neither is there any authorisation with 
respect to such exercises, with there being no inclusion of military exercises or related 
activities in the list of freedoms.
The lack of direct reference to military activities is not fatal to the case for the conduct 
of surveillance in the EEZ of another State. The rights listed in article 87(1) are by no 
means an exhaustive list, and are merely specifically enunciated examples. This is 
explicit in the use of the phrase ‘inter alia’. Further, the freedoms of the high seas are 
described as being subject to the conditions set down in the LOSC and ‘other rules of 
international law’. The use of this language makes it clear that the LOSC is not intended 
to be the only source of law in relation to the use of the high seas or EEZ.
If the case for freedom to undertake military surveillance in another State’s EEZ can 
be made, it is clearly subject to some qualification. For this the crux of the issue will 
essentially turn on the meaning of the phrase ‘with due regard’. This qualification is 
applied to high seas freedoms generally in article 87(2), and it would seem logical 
that one must have due regard to the rights of others while navigating through the 
EEZ.34
Undertaking surveillance of another State from that State’s EEZ would not, in the 
ordinary course of events, be without due regard for other ships or aircraft. In the case 
of a ship, the act of navigating safely, with data gathering sensors deployed would not 
necessarily interfere with other vessels’ use of the waters, unless the use of a sensor, 
such as a towed array, in some way impeded fishing or navigation. With aircraft, it is 
submitted that the prospect of such inconvenience is even more unlikely.
One issue that could be relevant in assessing the legitimacy of military surveillance 
from the EEZ or high seas relates to whether such surveillance might constitute a 
threat to international peace and security, and therefore be illegitimate. The LOSC 
provides limited assistance through article 88 which provides: the high seas shall be 
reserved for peaceful purposes.
A wide reading of this provision would, in theory, see great limitation of the uses of 
warships on the high seas, and the potential circumscription on intelligence gathering. 
When read with the Preamble, which invokes the LOSC’s role in the furtherance of peace 
and security in the world,35 it suggests only peaceful uses of the sea are permissible. By 
extension this could be drawn into the EEZ, as article 58 adopts the high seas freedoms 
in the LOSC, and explicitly includes article 88 in this list.36 Similarly, the provisions 
with respect to marine scientific research under Part XIII of the LOSC indicate that 
marine scientific research can only be undertaken for peaceful purposes.37 A case 
could be made that military surveillance from the high seas or another State’s EEZ 
were incompatible with the LOSC.
Such an interpretation has not been favoured by many States or publicists.38 The San 
Remo Manual on Armed Conflicts at Sea, which sought to update and consolidate the 
law of armed conflict at sea, makes it clear that armed conflict at sea can take place on 
the high seas, and in certain circumstances in the EEZ of a neutral State.39 The Manual 
allows that provided belligerents have due regard to the uses to which another State 
may wish to put its EEZ and avoid damage to the coastal State, then armed conflict 
can occur in the EEZ of a neutral State. Clearly, if armed conflict can occur in another 
State’s EEZ, it is difficult to assert that surveillance conducted in a passive way is 
contrary to international law.
First, such an interpretation would be difficult to reconcile with the regime of innocent 
passage that is applicable to warships. Any warship may constitute a danger to States 
in its vicinity. By its very nature, such a ship is designed to engage in, or assist other 
ships engage in armed conflict. It may be difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
whether a transiting warship has activated passive sensors, and certainly inconsistent 
with international law to stop and board such a vessel to ascertain this, given the 
sovereign immune status of the vessel.40
None of the above analysis undermines the legitimacy that voyages intended to be a 
threat to international peace are unlawful. Certainly a ship purporting to exercise a 
right of innocent passage that was in another State’s territorial sea for the purpose 
of intelligence gathering as a prelude to armed conflict would not be consistent with 
the LOSC. An argument could also be made that a similar voyage that remained in 
the EEZ might also be unlawful, as its intention was to assist a manifestly unlawful 
act. However, in such a case it is the wider behaviour and motivation that would 
render such a journey unlawful, not the actual act of navigation itself. Consequently, 
routine intelligence gathering flights or voyages through another State’s EEZ would 
not of themselves be illegal, unless they formed a prelude to an unauthorised attack 
on another State.
The NWC paper also considered briefly the crash landing of a United States Navy (USN) 
aircraft on Hainan Island in 2001 in the context of military activities in the EEZ. On 
1 April 2001, there was a mid-air collision between a Chinese F-8-II ‘Finback’ fighter 
and an American EP-3E Aries aircraft, off the southern coast of China. The Chinese 
fighter crashed into the sea, resulting in the loss of its pilot, Wang Wei; the American 
EP-3E was severely damaged, and ultimately made an emergency landing at Lingshui 
airfield on Hainan Island in China. The aircrew of the American aircraft were arrested, 
and the incident sparked a diplomatic crisis. Thirteen days later the aircrew were 
released, as was the aircraft in June 2001, when it was airlifted from China by a leased 
Russian Antonov cargo aircraft.41
The collision followed a series of close passes and shadowing of American EP-3Es 
by Chinese fighters. The fighters were attempting to deter the American aircraft 
from passing close to the Chinese coast, and utilise the EP-3E’s highly sophisticated 
intelligence gathering capabilities. China regarded the flights as essentially ‘spy 
flights’ and considered them contrary to international law. The United States attitude 
was that the aircraft were in international airspace, and therefore were exercising 
their freedom of overflight in international law. Both States had been in dispute over 
similar flights for a considerable period of time prior to this incident, with it being the 
regular practice of Chinese fighter pilots in flying at extremely close range to American 
planes, ostensibly to deter them from continuing. Several near misses had occurred 
during earlier flights prior to the collision in this incident.
The collision between the United States and Chinese aircraft occurred in international 
airspace as recognised by both States.42 It also took place outside a 24 nautical mile 
security zone claimed by China, but not recognised by the United States.43 While the 
EP-3E ultimately did enter Chinese national airspace, and landed on Chinese territory, 
it was also not disputed by both States that this incursion was motivated entirely by 
the distress the aircraft was in as a result of the collision. The key issue in this context 
relates to the activities undertaken by the aircraft prior to the collision.
The Chinese objection to the flights centred on their purpose. China considered the 
activities as being overt intelligence gathering by another military power, which 
were designed to provide detailed information that could be used in any conflict. 
Such activities therefore, according to China, undermined international peace and 
security of the EEZ, and therefore were not lawful.44 The Chinese Foreign Affairs 
Ministry stated:
The act of the US side constitutes a violation of the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides, among other things, that 
the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of a coastal State over its Exclusive 
Economic Zone, particularly its right to maintain peace, security and 
good order in the waters of the Zone, shall all be respected and that a 
country shall conform to the UNCLOS and other rules of international 
law when exercising its freedom of the high seas.45
For China, the collision that subsequently occurred was as a result of an unlawful and 
unwanted activity, that the Chinese aircraft, like others before it, was doing its best to 
intimidate and deter without the use of force.
The United States’ view was that any activity that occurs in international airspace 
should be treated as legal, unless it involves hostilities against another friendly power. 
The use of passive systems to collect information from an area not subject to national 
jurisdiction is therefore entirely legitimate. The actions by the Chinese pilots in 
flying at close range to American aircraft in international airspace was reckless, and 
endangered their lives as well as those in the EP-3E’s, as was tragically demonstrated 
on 1 April 2001. 
While the Chinese objections are understandable, and in other circumstances 
intelligence gathering flights could be a provocative prelude to an armed conflict, the 
American position probably more closely reflects the current content of international 
law. Freedom of navigation in international airspace is not regulated, at least for State 
aircraft. If there is no restriction on the flight path on such an aircraft, it is not tenable 
to restrict the use of sensors on board. To forbid its movement on the basis of its status 
as a military State aircraft would effectively end all freedom of navigation, even on 
the high seas, which is manifestly not the intention of the LOSC, State practice or the 
International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case.46
Again, the threat posed to existing international structures is present, but stable, insofar 
as it has not significantly increased in recent years. Although China would be reluctant 
to concede it, the US position in respect of the crash landing of its aircraft on Hainan 
Island was probably borne out by events, and suggests that a robust approach to the 
assertion of maritime rights can be effective in maintaining international regimes.
The NWC paper also considered some maritime security issues, although they are 
not explored to the same extent as those in respect of navigation. This emphasis is 
surprising, as it is in the area of maritime security that most development within the 
law of the sea has taken place in the last decade.  
In the years since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, 
there have been a number of developments that potentially have implications with 
respect to boarding ships at sea. The implications of each of these measures will be 
considered in turn.
The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code has been instituted under 
the auspices of the IMO to provide for greater security for ships and port facilities 
in an environment more conscious of the risks of terrorist attack.47 In the context of 
boarding and interdiction of vessels, the ISPS Code does not provide for boarding of 
vessels at sea by States other than the flag State. 
Negotiated in the wake of the hijacking of the cruise liner Achille Lauro in the 1980s, the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(SUA Convention) provides a framework for dealing with terrorist and like acts against 
ships at sea.48 It was negotiated in part because the traditional definition of piracy, 
as reflected in LOSC article 110 required the activities to have been committed for 
private ends, which may not include terrorist acts as perpetrators might be motivated 
by a political cause.
Parties to the SUA Convention have a wide jurisdiction to deal with offences against 
shipping, including seizing a ship, performing acts of violence against individuals on a 
ship, or damaging a ship or its cargo to endanger its safe navigation. While jurisdiction 
to make laws to create offences for these activities is widely construed, being based on 
flag or the physical presence of a vessel in the territorial sea, or even attempted coercion 
of the State concerned or its nationals, the SUA Convention does not authorise boarding 
of a ship at sea by any State other than the flag State. Further, the Preamble of the SUA 
Convention provides ‘matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed 
by the rules and principles of general international law’, which would appear to limit 
non-flag State intervention to acts covered under article 110 of the LOSC, which would 
essentially be acts of piracy. The only mechanism that might permit another State to 
have a role is in article 8 of the SUA Convention, which provides the master of a vessel 
may hand individuals over to a ‘receiving State’, other than the flag State.  
The adoption of the SUA Convention by States was initially slow, but gathered pace 
strongly in the years following the 2001 terrorist attacks. Since that time, further 
diplomatic efforts to extend the scope of the Convention have been pursued within the 
IMO, leading to the adoption of a Protocol to the SUA Convention in late 2005.49
The principal focus of the 2005 SUA Protocol is on weapons of mass destruction and 
their non-proliferation, but the amendments also create additional offences of using a 
ship as a platform for terrorist activities,50 as well as the transportation of an individual 
who has committed an offence under the SUA Convention,51 or any of another nine 
listed anti-terrorism conventions.52 However, for the purposes of this discussion article 
8bis potentially widens the scope for third party boarding of ships and needs to be 
specifically considered.
The operative provision for a third party boarding of a vessel at sea is article 8bis(5) 
of the 2005 SUA Protocol. It provides:
5. Whenever law enforcement or other authorized officials of a 
State Party (‘the requesting Party’) encounter a ship flying the flag or 
displaying marks of registry of another State Party (‘the first Party’) 
located seaward of any State’s territorial sea, and the requesting Party 
has reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or a person on board 
the ship has been, is or is about to be involved in the commission of an 
offence set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater, and the requesting 
Party desires to board,
(a) it shall request, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 that 
the first Party confirm the claim of nationality, and
(b) if nationality is confirmed, the requesting Party shall ask 
the first Party (hereinafter referred to as ‘the flag State’) for 
authorisation to board and to take appropriate measures with 
regard to that ship which may include stopping, boarding and 
searching the ship, its cargo and persons on board, and questioning 
the persons on board in order to determine if an offence set forth 
in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to 
be committed, and
(c) the flag State shall either:
(i) authorize the requesting Party to board and to take 
appropriate measures set out in subparagraph (b), subject to 
any conditions it may impose in accordance with paragraph 
7; or
(ii) conduct the boarding and search with its own law 
enforcement or other officials; or
(iii) conduct the boarding and search together with the 
requesting Party, subject to any conditions it may impose in 
accordance with paragraph 7; or
(iv) decline to authorize a boarding and search.
The requesting Party shall not board the ship or take measures set out in 
subparagraph (b) without the express authorisation of the flag State.
This provision provides that a third State may board after ascertaining the nationality of 
a vessel suspected of committing an offence under article 3 or its related amendments, 
notifying the flag State and obtaining the consent of the flag State. In the absence of 
this consent from the flag State, a boarding cannot take place. A mechanism does 
exist to try to avoid intransigence by the flag State, where the flag State may lodge a 
declaration in article 8bis granting a right to board four hours after request to board, 
or a declaration permitting boarding by other State parties.
If evidence of a past, current or imminent offence is discovered in the course of a 
boarding, the flag State still retains jurisdiction, but it may authorise the boarding State 
to detain the vessel, its cargo and crew pending further instructions. It is clear from 
the text that the flag State is to remain in control, and that a boarding and subsequent 
discovery of an offence does not act as a basis for the boarding State to take over the 
matter. Article 8bis in part states:
7. The flag State, consistent with the other provisions of this 
Convention, may subject its authorisation under paragraph 5 or 6 
to conditions, including obtaining additional information from the 
requesting Party, and conditions relating to responsibility for and 
the extent of measures to be taken. No additional measures may 
be taken without the express authorisation of the flag State, except 
when necessary to relieve imminent danger to the lives of persons or 
where those measures derive from relevant bilateral or multilateral 
agreements.
8. For all boardings pursuant to this article, the flag State has the right 
to exercise jurisdiction over a detained ship, cargo or other items and 
persons on board, including seizure, forfeiture, arrest and prosecution. 
However, the flag State may, subject to its constitution and laws, consent 
to the exercise of jurisdiction by another State having jurisdiction under 
article 6.
The practical upshot of these measures is that State parties to the SUA Convention 
and 2005 SUA Protocol, when the latter enters into force, will be able to board each 
other’s vessels at sea, with each other’s consent. This consent may be expedited through 
declarations being made, but will still be required to found any further action. The 
2005 Protocol also envisages cooperation between States with respect to how such 
boardings and subsequent action might take place.53
The Proliferation Security Initiative is an informal international understanding 
that provides a basis for cooperative action at sea to deal with vessels suspected of 
carrying weapons of mass destruction or related equipment to non-state actors. It is 
not a treaty and therefore is not binding, but rather a statement of intention indicated 
by States, indicating how they plan to cooperate and what steps might be taken to 
intercept a suspected cargo. A number of States have indicated their strong support 
for the Proliferation Security Initiative, while many more have shown an interest in 
participating.54
In the context of boarding and interdiction, there has been a Statement of Interdiction 
Principles made by the Proliferation Security Initiative States, and a portion of this is 
directly relevant to the boarding and interdiction of vessels at sea:
Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding 
cargoes of [weapons of mass destruction], their delivery systems, or 
related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit 
and consistent with their obligations under international law and 
frameworks, to include:
(a) Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes 
to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and 
not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
(b) At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown 
by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel 
flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas or areas 
beyond the territorial seas of any other state that is reasonably 
suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-
state actors of proliferation concerns, and to seize such cargoes 
that are identified.
(c) To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate 
circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag 
vessels by other states and to the seizure of such [weapons of mass 
destruction]-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified 
by such states.
(d) To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in 
their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when 
declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such 
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern 
and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce 
conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal 
waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying 
such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to 
boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.55
This Statement provides for two distinct jurisdictional bases for boarding a vessel. The 
first is flag State jurisdiction, where a flag State undertakes to board and search vessels 
flying its flag reasonably suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction or related 
material and to seize such cargo if found. This is clearly consistent with international 
law, as such enforcement is restricted to the flag State’s waters, or waters beyond its 
jurisdiction, but outside the territorial sea of another State.
Flag State jurisdiction is also available to third States where the flag State undertakes 
to ‘seriously consider’ providing consent to the boarding States to board, search and 
if necessary seize the cargo. It is significant that while the possibility of third State 
action is clearly contemplated, States supporting the Statement are only obliged to 
‘seriously consider’ rather than to acquiesce to a third State boarding.
The second basis of jurisdiction for boarding and interdiction is territorial jurisdiction, 
where the flag State of the vessel concerned is not relevant. This has the coastal State 
asserting jurisdiction over a vessel because of its presence in the territorial sea, 
without necessarily obtaining the consent of the flag State. There has been significant 
academic debate over the legality of this territorial basis for stopping and boarding 
ships, and seizing cargoes. Certainly, it would not prima facie seem consistent with a 
right of innocent passage and the restrictions on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction 
by a coastal State over vessels passing through their territorial sea.  
While a number of arguments can be raised in support of the legality of such an 
interception, including the right of a coastal State to act in its individual or collective 
self-defence, there has not been support for this mode of action to date in the United 
Nations Security Council. The Council may make a resolution pursuant to Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter, if it feels the application of force would assist in combating 
a threat to international peace and security, and therefore could provide legitimate 
authority for a coastal State to stop and board a suspect vessel in its territorial sea, 
or even outside it.56 Security Council Resolution 1540 urges States to prohibit the 
transit of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors, but it does not create any 
positive duty upon States to undertake interdiction of such vessels. The Resolution 
only authorises such action as is ‘consistent with international law’,57 and therefore 
boarding a suspect vessel in the territorial sea may not be legitimate.
One issue that has occurred with the development of the PSI has been the conclusion 
of ship boarding agreements between the United States and a number of flag States 
with open registries. These agreements permit the United States to stop and board 
vessels flagged in the participating States, often with short term notice and permission 
periods, in order to search and seize weapons of mass destruction or associated delivery 
systems. The agreements are mostly reciprocal, so in theory participating States could 
exercise identical powers over suspect United States flagged vessels, but practically 
speaking the prospect of this occurring is remote. At the time of writing, seven such 
agreements had been concluded, with another yet to enter into force.  The agreements 
are with Panama, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Croatia, Belize, Cyprus and Malta, with 
an agreement with Mongolia yet to enter into force.58
The NWC paper refers to regional developments as being significant and increasingly 
common. This is a logical and reasonable assessment of international practice in a 
number of areas, most notably in fisheries management and environmental protection. 
Similar structures with respect to security may also emerge in the years to come, 
something which is already happening in specific subject areas within Australia’s 
region.59
In terms of non-proliferation, the NWC paper poses a relatively pessimistic future with 
up to 30 nuclear armed States and concern that the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons 1968 will collapse under the pressure caused by the emergence of 
new nuclear States. It should be noted that the workshop on which the NWC paper is 
based took place in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test, and in an environment 
where UN responses to the nuclear activities of North Korea and Iran were proving 
ineffectual. In the months since November 2006, North Korea has apparently accepted a 
diplomatic solution to bring about nuclear disarmament.60 While the situation with Iran 
remains tense, the prognostication of the collapse of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons 1968 is much less likely than previously.61
Regional responses to ocean issues are, as was pointed out in the NWC paper, significant 
in a number of areas, most notably in the context of fisheries and environmental 
protection. Australian participation in regional arrangements of this nature is common, 





Plant Protection Agreement for the Asia and 
Pacific Region 
1956 Yes
The Antarctic Treaty 1959 Yes
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals 
1972 Yes
Convention on Conservation of Nature in the 
South Pacific
1976 Yes
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency 
Convention
1979 Yes
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources
1980 Yes




Convention for the Protection of the Natural 
Resources and Environment of the South Pacific 
Region, Noumea 
1986 Yes
Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the 
South Pacific Region by Dumping
1986 Yes
Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating 
Pollution Emergencies in the South Pacific 
Region
1986 Yes
South Pacific Fisheries Convention 1987 Yes
Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing With 
Long Drift Nets In the South Pacific 
1989 Yes
Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental 
Protection
1991 Yes
Convention for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna
1992 Yes
Agreement for the establishment of the Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission
1993 Yes
Agreement establishing the South Pacific 
Regional Environmental Programme
1993 Yes
Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum 
Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive 
Wastes and to Control the Transboundary 
Movement and Management of Hazardous 
Wastes within the South Pacific Region (The 
Waigani Convention)
1995 Yes
South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement 2006 Not yet in force




Table 7: Regional environmental and fisheries treaties
It is evident from this list that Australia has been heavily engaged in the region in 
participating in regional fisheries and environmental agreements. Australia is equally 
significantly engaged in security cooperation throughout the region, with formal 
relationships existing with New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea 
and most recently Indonesia. Were there to be regional developments in responding 
to security or other measures at a regional level, Australia would certainly be engaged 
in those developments, and would in all likelihood play a leading role.
The NWC paper also expressed concern at the stability of the regime for refugees, in 
the face of large movements of displaced persons. At international law, the treatment 
of refugees claiming asylum is, like the duty to render assistance, of great age, and 
has been incorporated into modern treaty law. The Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees 1951 and its 1967 Protocol deal with the obligations upon State Parties, 
including Australia, in dealing with refugees arriving in its territory.62 A refugee is 
defined under article 1 as a person with a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
who is outside their country of nationality, and is unwilling or unable to seek its help, 
and is unwilling to return. Most importantly is the obligation upon States under article 
33 of the Refugees Convention, which contains the non-refoulement principle:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
This provision restricts a State that has individuals with refugee-status from deporting 
those individuals to where they might be persecuted, and has the effect of restricting 
the similar expulsion of any person claiming such status at least until that claim has 
been reviewed. 
The standard which is set by international law is determined domestically by State 
Parties, and in the case of Australia is found in the operation of the Migration Act 1958.63 
This Act adopts the international standard, and puts in place review mechanisms, which 
themselves can be subject to administrative review by a specialised agency. These 
procedures typically take many months, and as a result detention centres have been 
established at a variety of locations to house asylum-seekers pending the resolution 
of their status.
While influxes of people claiming refugee status have, from time to time, placed these 
systems under pressure, there is little reason to suggest that international law will 
change to meet the demands of larger movements of people. In times of war in parts of 
Africa, hundreds of thousands if not millions of people have been displaced, bringing 
about vast humanitarian crises. While these crises are serious and have caused 
tremendous difficulties for the receiving States and the international community, there 
has been no serious effort by States to revisit the content of the Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees 1951.64

Regional practice in relation to the law of the sea varies greatly, and is significant 
to Australia insofar as it may negatively impact upon freedom of navigation through 
the region. The assessment of regional practice contained here is brief, and will be 
in the form of a short summary of each State’s practice.  It is intended that detailed 
summaries of regional State practice in the law of the sea will be produced in a 
subsequent work.
All States in Australia’s region claim the full range of maritime zones, to the maximum 
extent permissible, with the exception of Singapore, which still only claims a three 
nautical mile territorial sea. As such, all of those considered below have a 12 nautical 
mile territorial sea and 200 nautical mile EEZ. Further, these zones are applied to all 
areas which they claim, including the Spratly Islands and elsewhere.
China has a restrictive law of the sea practice, particularly with respect to freedom of 
navigation. Its restrictive approach is exacerbated by the use of territorial sea baselines 
that are in excess of what is permitted under the LOSC, which have the effect of greatly 
extending Chinese jurisdiction out to sea. Illegal basepoints have been used, and the 
baselines themselves enclose coastal areas which are neither deeply indented, masked 
by fringing islands, or possess any other justification. 
Chinese legislation requires that warships receive prior authorisation before entering 
Chinese territorial waters. Such a requirement is inconsistent with the rules for 
innocent passage. China also asserts a right to a security jurisdiction within its 
contiguous zone. Since the contiguous zone under the LOSC limits jurisdiction to fiscal, 
immigration, sanitary and customs jurisdiction, as assertion over matters pertaining 
to security is also contrary to international law.
China also requires notice of shipments of waste through its territorial sea and EEZ. 
While there are special requirements for the shipment of nuclear materials through 
the territorial sea, these do not extend to the EEZ, and do not apply to all types of waste 
passing through the territorial sea. 
Fiji’s claims of jurisdiction over the territorial sea and other maritime zones reflect 
international law closely, with legislation guaranteeing the right of all vessels to 
exercise a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Its archipelagic 
baselines are largely in accordance with international law, and although legislative 
provisions to do so exist, no ASL have been proclaimed.
India claims the full range of maritime zones in accordance with international law; 
however, its practice with respect to foreign vessels and military exercises is restrictive 
and in breach of international law. India has a requirement of notice to be given by 
foreign warships prior to entering its territorial sea.  
In addition, India also asserts a security jurisdiction over the contiguous zone. Since the 
contiguous zone under the LOSC limits jurisdiction to fiscal, immigration, sanitary and 
customs jurisdiction, as assertion over matters pertaining to security is also contrary 
to international law.
India also seeks to restrict access and activities in its EEZ. It requires prior permission 
to be given of any military exercises or manoeuvres taking place in its EEZ. India 
also requires 24 hour notice of vessels carrying ‘dangerous goods and chemicals, oil, 
noxious liquid and harmful substances and radioactive material’. There is no basis in 
international law for these measures.
It is significant to note that Indonesian perceptions of the application of international 
law are often significantly at variance with more widely accepted interpretations. 
This is most clearly seen in relation to ASL. After the initial Indonesian proposal in 
1996 of designating only three North-South lanes, and no others, there was significant 
international protest from maritime States, including Australia, the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Japan. As a result of this protest, when Indonesia commenced 
negotiations with the IMO, Australia and the United States participated in the 
discussions. In the final wash-up, in 1998, Indonesia was able to keep its three lanes, 
but these were explicitly stated to be a ‘partial designation’, leaving the way open for 
maritime States to regard any route used by international navigation as an ASL.
However, statements by Indonesia since the partial designation make it clear that 
it has a different view. The statement released by the Indonesian Foreign Minister 
immediately following the adoption of the ASL does not use the word partial anywhere in 
the text, and there was no reference to any of the discussions with other States although 
the history of lodgement of the proposal with IMO was referred to. In unreported 
statements in Jakarta in 2003, an Indonesian Foreign Ministry official stated that the 
designation should not be treated as partial, and that ASL passage ought to be limited 
only to the designated lanes.
Indonesia has promulgated legislation dealing explicitly with ASL passage. Act No. 6 of 
8 August 1996 provides in Chapter III for ‘peaceful crossing rights’ and ‘archipelagic sea 
channel crossing rights’. The former appears to equate to the regime of innocent passage 
under the LOSC. In accordance with the regime of innocent passage under LOSC 
article 25, Indonesia reserves the right to ‘temporarily postpone peaceful crossing’ of 
its territorial sea and archipelagic waters for ‘the protection of its security, including 
the purpose of arms/weapons training’. Submarines and other submerged vehicles are 
required to navigate on the surface and show their flag in this mode of passage.
The part of Chapter III dealing with ASL passage is of greater concern. It provides for 
such passage according to the LOSC, but only at ‘specially stipulated sea channels’. 
This is contrary to the negotiation of the partial designation of ASL, which was intended 
to allow other lanes to be used. In the absence of a designated ASL, the LOSC permits 
routes normally used for international navigation to be used for ASL passage. Since 
the three existing Indonesian lanes are not intended to be a complete designation, 
it follows other routes used for international navigation retain their status as being 
used as ASL. ASL passage cannot be validly suspended by the archipelagic State at 
any time, and is also applicable to aircraft, which is not the case for innocent passage. 
Further, Australia takes the view, along with other maritime States, that ASL passage 
allows transit in ‘normal mode’, which includes submerged submarine transit, and the 
undertaking of all usual shipboard activities and security measures.
Malaysia relies heavily upon the benefits to its economy arising from the freedom 
of navigation through the Malacca Strait, and accordingly its legislation upholds the 
freedom of navigation in a manner consistent with international law.    
More controversially, Malaysia has taken the view that military exercises in its EEZ 
require Malaysian consent. There is nothing in the LOSC that indicates that any such 
jurisdiction exists. The only restrictions imposed upon States seeking to undertake 
military exercises in another State’s EEZ is to have due regard for the uses of others, 
and to do nothing which impedes the coastal State from exercising its jurisdiction. 
As such, while exercises could not be undertaken in a fashion to endanger a fishing 
fleet or oil platform, there is no justification for the blanket permission required by 
Malaysia.
Papua New Guinea is an archipelagic State, in spite of its mainland territory sharing 
a land boundary with Indonesia. There is no indication of any assertion of jurisdiction 
by Papua New Guinea that would be contrary to the LOSC. Its archipelagic baselines 
are largely in accordance with international law, although the formal baselines were 
only declared in 2002. No ASL have been proclaimed.
Pakistan does require notification of foreign warships entering its territorial sea, even 
if such vessels are exercising a right of innocent passage. There is no requirement 
in international law for such notification to be given where a warship is exercising a 
right of innocent passage, and Pakistan’s legislation on this point has been the subject 
of protest by the United States. Pakistan has a contiguous zone which extends to 
24 nautical miles. The extent of the zone is consistent with international law. Pakistan 
also purports to possess jurisdiction over fiscal, immigration, sanitary, customs and 
security matters. Only the first four of these are consistent with the LOSC, while there 
is no justification for security.
The Philippines largely complies with the requirements of the LOSC with respect to 
the transit of vessels, although it has expressed concern over military activities in its 
EEZ. However, there are no specific provisions limiting military vessels transiting 
through the archipelago. Contrary to the LOSC, the Philippines has proclaimed its 
territorial waters to be all those waters contained in what is usually described as the 
Treaty Limits Box. This large Box extends to as much as 350 kilometres away from 
the coast of the Philippines, and is therefore not permissible at international law. 
Australia and other States have protested the maintenance of the Box, even though the 
Philippines has indicated it will not enforce rights in the Box in a manner inconsistent 
with the LOSC. 
The Solomon Islands is yet to seek the promulgation of archipelagic sea lanes. Section 
10 of the Delimitation of Marine Waters Act 1978 does provide that the relevant Solomons 
minister can proclaim ASL in accordance with international law, but until this takes 
place, routes normally used by international navigation may be used for ASL passage. 
Rights of navigation in accordance with international law are explicitly guaranteed in 
the Delimitation of Marine Waters Act 1978.
Sri Lanka claims the full range of maritime zones in accordance with international 
law; however, its practice with respect to foreign vessels and military exercises is 
restrictive and in breach of international law. Sri Lanka has a requirement of notice to 
be given by foreign warships prior to entering its territorial sea.  
In addition, Sri Lanka also asserts a security jurisdiction over the contiguous zone. 
Since the contiguous zone under the LOSC limits jurisdiction to fiscal, immigration, 
sanitary and customs jurisdiction, as assertion over matters pertaining to security is 
also contrary to international law.
Sri Lanka also seeks to restrict military activities in its EEZ. It requires prior permission 
to be given of any military exercises or manoeuvres taking place in its EEZ. There is 
no basis in international law for these measures.
In the international community, most States do not recognise the government of Taiwan, 
but rather recognises the sovereignty over the island being vested in the People’s 
Republic of China. Some aspects of the law of the sea practice of the government in 
Taipei are not consistent with international law. Taiwan provides that foreign civilian 
ships are entitled to exercise a right of innocent passage if such a right is available to 
Taiwanese vessels under the reciprocity principle. Foreign military and government 
vessels are required to give notice of passage through the Taiwanese territorial sea. 
Such a requirement is not consistent with international law.
Outside the territorial sea, Taiwan is mostly compliant with international law, with 
the exception of the waters of the Taiwan Strait outside its territorial sea. It provides 
the Taiwanese government can regulate foreign transiting vessels in the Taiwan Strait 
used for international navigation on the following subjects:
1. the maintenance of navigation safety and the regulation of maritime traffic
2. the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the environment
3. the prohibition of fishing
4. the prevention and punishment of loading or unloading of any commodity, currency 
or person in contravention of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and 
regulations of the Republic of China.
While the second and third are permissible, and the fourth permisible in the contiguous 
zone, the first goes beyond what is allowable under international law.
Thailand has also acted entirely with the LOSC in relation to issues of passage. Thailand 
has explicitly stated that it supports the existing passage regimes with respect to 
innocent passage through the territorial sea, and transit passage through international 
straits. Further, it has rejected the notion that warships exercising such passage rights 
ought to give prior notification of their transits. The Thai position was incorporated into 
a statement by the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made in August 1995.
Vanuatu’s claims of jurisdiction over the territorial sea reflect international law quite 
closely, even to the extent of guaranteeing in legislation the right of all vessels to 
exercise a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Its archipelagic baselines 
are in accordance with international law, but no ASL have been proclaimed.
Vietnam claims a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, in accordance with the LOSC. However, 
Decree No. 30-CP, issued in 1980, requires a 30 day authorisation period by foreign 
warships and ‘military ships’ to receive permission to exercise a right of innocent 
passage through Vietnamese waters. Once granted, there is a 48 hour pre-entry 
notification required. Non-military vessels must seek permission with a minimum 
of 24 hours notice, after seeking permission seven days in advance, unless they are 
not commercial vessels, in which case the notification increases to 48 hours and the 
permission to 15 days. Vietnam also claims that no more than three warships of the 
same nationality may be present in its territorial sea, nor may they stay on visits for 
more than one week.
Vietnam also has specified routes which foreign vessels must follow, and designated 
‘forbidden areas’ which these vessels may not enter. Since the designated routes 
are not navigational measures set up in consultation with the IMO, such as a traffic 
separation scheme, they are also unlawful, in the territorial sea. While navigation in 
the territorial sea is, at international law, subject to the regime of innocent passage, 
there is no restriction as to route other than being continuous and expedition, unless 
there are navigational measures such as a traffic separation scheme. Permanently 
forbidden areas are only legitimate if they are in internal waters.
Vietnam claims similar security rights for the contiguous zone, as it does in the 
territorial sea. For warships, notice requirements are again asserted, as well as a 
requirement for weapons to be in a ‘non-operative position’ and ammunition locked 
away and gun barrels covered. Submarines are obliged to navigate on the surface and 
show their flag.
All of these measures are contrary to international law. Ships have freedom of navigation 
outside the territorial sea, and as long as they pose no direct threat to shipping or 
the coastal State, can exercise with their weapons. Submarines are only obliged to 
navigate on the surface when exercising a right of innocent passage in the territorial 
sea, and therefore there is no requirement for such navigation in the contiguous zone. 
The notification requirements are, as with the territorial sea, without foundation at 
international law.
Restrictions on international navigation by coastal States present a serious threat to 
Australia’s international maritime interests. Any limitations upon the movement of 
vessels engaged in international trade around the region would have a profoundly 
negative effect upon the Australian economy. Ensuring the existing freedom of 
navigation regime is retained and supported worldwide should be viewed as an essential 
foreign policy objective for Australia.
There are a number of ways in which an increasingly restrictive navigation regime 
internationally might affect Australian interests. First, ADF ships, submarines and 
aircraft might find their access to certain areas of the ocean and super-adjacent airspace 
becoming restricted or subject to unacceptable limitations. Prior entry notification, 
navigation on the surface for submarines, and the restriction of international straits 
and ASL are not currently permissible at international law, and would limit the ADF’s 
operational effectiveness throughout the region. It could also impede the transit of allied 
navies in times of heightened tension or armed conflict, also hampering the efforts of 
coalitions of which Australia is a part.
Second, Australian commercial shipping, and other flag carriers of Australian exports 
and imports use many important sea routes that pass through international straits, 
archipelagic waters or areas subject to claims of security jurisdiction by the littoral 
State. The interruption of these commercial vessels, even for a short time, would have 
a very detrimental impact upon the Australian economy. Consequently, it is vital for 
the right of freedom of navigation to be upheld and maintained for commercial traffic 
as well as military.
Given the assertion of jurisdiction by coastal States beyond the ambit of the LOSC, it 
appears to be motivated most commonly by a desire to improve maritime security, 
as most of the restrictions relate to the activities of warships, and, to a lesser extent, 
military aircraft. Most coastal States, like Australia, also draw substantial benefit 
from the freedom of navigation, so have not, to date, been over zealous in asserting 
their security regimes. An exception to this would be North Korea, but fortunately, its 
waters are far from maritime trade routes which are of significance to Australia. While 
there has been some tension with China with respect to transits through the Taiwan 
Straits, there is no indication this has prevented a strengthening of the relationships, 
diplomatic and defence-based, that have grown over the last decade, and will likely 
continue to grow under the new Rudd Government in Australia.
A number of responses to assertions of security jurisdiction by coastal States, or other 
restrictions on freedom of navigation, are possible. First, Australia could engage in 
a systematic program of diplomatic protest in respect of regional maritime claims, 
which cannot be justified under international law. To date, there has been little 
diplomatic activity directed at maritime claims by other States, and to allow claims to 
go unchallenged over a long period of time weakens Australia’s position. While protests 
have been made in respect of particular areas which were relevant because of an 
ongoing operation, such as Australia’s protest to Iran over the legality of its territorial 
sea baselines in the Persian Gulf, other areas of greater strategic importance, but not 
the site of extant conflict or activity, have not been the subject of protest.
Second, Australia might seek to take a leaf out of the United States’ book and initiate 
a Freedom of Navigation program. The Freedom of Navigation program requires the 
USN to be cognisant of maritime claims disputed by the United States, and to, where 
possible, operationally assert rights of freedom of navigation or military exercise, as 
appropriate. As such USN vessels will regularly detour into waters subject to claim or 
restriction by coastal States, to ensure there is a practical demonstration of the United 
States’ failure to accept these claims and restrictions. The Freedom of Navigation 
program is applied to allies’ claims as well as other States, and is the subject of annual 
reporting to Congress by the USN and the State Department.
Freedom of navigation efforts become more complex when asserted on behalf of 
Australian commercial interests. First, innocent passage permits vessels to pass 
continuously and expeditiously through the territorial sea of a coastal State, and 
prohibits activities that are not incidental to passage. Transit and ASL passage have 
similar restrictions. RAN ships accompanying Australian flagged vessels through the 
territorial sea of another State would not be in a position to stop or request to board 
other transiting vessels, including Australian vessels, unless they were assisting such 
vessels when in danger or distress.65
Outside of the territorial sea of third States and of Australian waters, there are issues 
with respect to commercial vessels being boarded by the ADF. International law does 
not permit a State to board another State’s vessels without its consent on the high 
seas, save in extremely limited circumstances. The provision of operational support 
to assert any freedom of navigation, would therefore have to be done with the express 
consent and cooperation of a flag State, to ensure that Australian personnel could get 
aboard supported vessels if necessary.
On balance, while some States assert jurisdiction over maritime areas, there is nothing 
to suggest that to date this has impacted negatively on Australian warships’ and other 
vessels’ access to important ocean passages. Developments in the law of the sea to 
date, while requiring monitoring, also do not suggest that the navigational regimes 
are being fatally undermined. The positive assertion through diplomatic means and 
regular ship transits would not impact negatively on the present situation, and would 
demonstrate an Australian commitment to uphold the existing law.
States through their warships or other government vessels, including coastguard 
vessels, may be able at international law to assert a right to board a vessel at sea. This 
may be through an assertion of jurisdiction over the vessel, the permission of the flag 
State, or through a mere right to visit the vessel. If the vessel in question refuses to 
comply to permit a boarding to take place, the question is raised as to what degree of 
force may be imposed in order to compel compliance.
The LOSC says very little as to what level of force may be imposed by a State in order to 
uphold its rights and jurisdiction at sea. The LOSC notes that the exercise of jurisdiction 
should be by a warship or other marked government vessel, which may imply some 
degree of force might be used, as most vessels fitting these descriptions are armed, 
but it is submitted that this is too much to read into the LOSC. As the LOSC does not 
deal with the issue, it is necessary to apply older principles of international law.
There have been a number of cases dealing with offshore maritime enforcement 
and the use of force. In the case of I’m Alone, a joint commission dealt with matters 
surrounding the pursuit and destruction of a Canadian vessel suspected of smuggling 
alcohol during Prohibition by the United States Coast Guard. The Commission, after 
dealing with issues of hot pursuit, held that the sinking of the I’m Alone, which had 
offered no threat to the pursuing coast guard vessels, was contrary to international 
law. The Commission was satisfied that a pursuing vessel might use necessary and 
reasonable force for the purpose of boarding, searching, seizing and bringing to port a 
vessel, and if in such circumstances the vessel was to sink, then that might acceptable, 
providing the sinking was incidental to necessary and reasonable action. However, 
where an unarmed vessel had been deliberately sunk, such action would be contrary 
to international law.66
In the case of the Red Crusader, an international inquiry between the United Kingdom 
and Denmark had to consider an incident between a Scottish trawler and a Danish 
fisheries patrol vessel in the waters around the Faroe Islands. After having been stopped 
by the Danish patrol vessel Neils Ebbesen on suspicion of fishing, the Red Crusader 
fled, taking two Danish crew members with her. The Neils Ebbesen gave chase, and 
ultimately fired upon the Red Crusader, initially with 40mm gun fire into mast, radar 
scanner and lights, and then into the ship’s stern. When this proved ineffective, Neils 
Ebbesen fired 127mm solid shot into the Red Crusader, with the incident brought to a 
close with the intervention of a Royal Navy vessel interposing itself between the two 
vessels. The Court of Inquiry held that the force used against the Red Crusader was 
contrary to international law. It considered the firing of solid shot into the Red Crusader 
without warning, and firing in such a way as to endanger human life exceeded the 
legitimate use of force.67
The most recent significant international case dealing with the use of force in 
enforcement actions at sea was that of the MV Saiga (No.2) before the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The Saiga was a tanker, registered in St Vincent and 
the Grenadines, that was engaged in bunkering fishing vessels off the coast of Guinea 
in 1997. A Guinean patrol vessel pursued the Saiga and fired into it, although it was 
disputed before the Tribunal what calibre of weapon was used. The Tribunal held that 
the level of force used by Guinea was excessive and stated:
155. In considering the force used by Guinea in the arrest of the Saiga, 
the Tribunal must take into account the circumstances of the arrest in 
the context of the applicable rules of international law. Although the 
Convention does not contain express provisions on the use of force in 
the arrest of ships, international law, which is applicable by virtue of 
article 293 of the Convention, requires that the use of force must be 
avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must not 
go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. 
Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they 
do in other areas of international law.
156. These principles have been followed over the years in law 
enforcement operations at sea. The normal practice used to stop a 
ship at sea is first to give an auditory or visual signal to stop, using 
internationally recognized signals. Where this does not succeed, a 
variety of actions may be taken, including the firing of shots across the 
bows of the ship. It is only after the appropriate actions fail that the 
pursuing vessel may, as a last resort, use force.68
This places a substantial restriction on the use of force in maritime enforcement. Aside 
from an exception in relation to self defence, which was touched upon in MV Saiga 
(No.2), but deemed inapplicable by the Tribunal in the circumstances, it certainly makes 
it explicit that the use of force is only permissible after a variety of other measures 
have been implemented, including warning shots across the bow. Together with Red 
Crusader and I’m Alone, it makes it most unlikely that the application of force that 
could potentially cause physical harm to humans in the arrest of a vessel at sea can 
be lawfully used.
Such an approach is largely duplicated in the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention. 
Article 8bis(9) provides:
9. When carrying out the authorized actions under this article, the use 
of force shall be avoided except when necessary to ensure the safety of 
its officials and persons on board, or where the officials are obstructed 
in the execution of the authorized actions. Any use of force pursuant 
to this article shall not exceed the minimum degree of force which is 
necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.
It is significant that the language used in the last sentence of this paragraph is identical 
to the phrase used by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in paragraph 
155 of its joint judgment in the MV Saiga. 
Notably, where a boarding is undertaken under article 8bis(10) of the 2005 SUA 
Protocol, the scope of the duty is more fully described, perhaps reflecting the heightened 
concern of States in regard the exercise of a power to board and arrest against their 
flagged vessels:
10. Safeguards:
(a) Where a State Party takes measures against a ship in 
accordance with this article, it shall:
(i) take due account of the need not to endanger the safety 
of life at sea;
(ii) ensure that all persons on board are treated in a manner 
which preserves their basic human dignity, and in compliance 
with the applicable provisions of international law, including 
international human rights law;
(iii)  ensure that a boarding and search pursuant to this article 
shall be conducted in accordance with applicable international 
law;
(iv) take due account of the safety and security of the ship 
and its cargo;
(v) take due account of the need not to prejudice the 
commercial or legal interests of the flag State;
(vi) ensure, within available means, that any measure taken 
with regard to the ship or its cargo is environmentally sound 
under the circumstances;
(vii) ensure that persons on board against whom proceedings 
may be commenced in connection with any of the offences 
set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater are afforded 
the protections of paragraph 2 of article 10, regardless of 
location;
(viii) ensure that the master of a ship is advised of its intention 
to board, and is, or has been, afforded the opportunity to contact 
the ship’s owner and the flag State at the earliest opportunity; 
and
(ix) take reasonable efforts to avoid a ship being unduly 
detained or delayed.
These provisions reinforce the basic position in respect of the use of force, but also 
flesh out detail on how a vessel and its crew must be dealt with. The level of detail 
would seem to go well beyond the previously discussed cases.
When ADF and other Australian Government personnel undertake maritime 
enforcement operations, including boardings, the above international law establishes 
the minimum standard for the use of force. This is both at international and domestic 
law, as Australian law adopts the relevant international law to determine the appropriate 
minimum standard for the use of force at sea.69
The lack of detail in the relevant international law presents a substantial challenge to 
those charged with ensuring the legality of Australian maritime enforcement actions, 
and a challenge which they may have to defend not only in Australian courts, but in 
international tribunals. The LOSC provides a mechanism for flag States of vessels 
that have been subject to arrest and seizure by a coastal State to have their vessel 
released through action before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.70 The 
Saiga discussed previously is an example of such an action, and it would present an 
opportunity for an international tribunal to comment on the legality of the use of force 
in boarding operations. Obviously this is an area of international law where further 
developments could have a substantial impact upon the manner in which Australia 
conducts the enforcement of its laws offshore.
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